Abstract-In cloud computing, data are managed by different entities, not only by the actual data owner but also by many cloud providers. Sophisticated clouds collaboration scenarios may require that the data objects are distributed at cloud providers and accessed remotely, while still being under the control of the data owners. This brings security challenges for distributed authorization and trust management that existing proposed schemes have not fully solved. In this paper, we propose a Dynamic Trust Establishment approach which can be incorporated into cloud services provisioning life-cycles for the multi-provider Intercloud environment. It relies on attribute-based policies as the mechanism for trust evaluation and delegation. The paper proposes a practical implementation approach for attribute-based policies evaluation using Multi-type Interval Decision Diagrams extended from Integer Decision Diagrams which is more efficient in terms of evaluation complexity than other evaluation approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
NIST's cloud computing definitions and cloud computing reference architectures [1] provide a basis for cooperation between providers to bring integrated cloud services to customers, as known as Intercloud [2] . In the Intercloud architecture, collaborations between providers form a hierarchical multilevel stack of cloud services where each service can compose from lower-level services and also be integrated into upper level ones. In Fig. 1 , Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers can aggregate individual virtualized resources from different Physical resources providers to build up virtual infrastructures consisting of virtual computing nodes, virtual storage, reserved network links, etc. Platform as a Service (PaaS) providers may outsource their infrastructures to IaaS providers and at the same time, provide platform services to Software as a Service (SaaS) providers. Prospective development of the cloud computing will include not only vertical service interactions but also horizontal interconnections to achieve reliability, scalability and cost efficiency.
An end-user's workflow on the cloud can be composed from a set of different cloud resources as shown in The discussed scenario brings challenges for authorization and trust management in the hierarchical and heterogeneous multi-provider environment. The problem is how to provide an effective, robust authorization mechanism in which an entity can delegate permissions to another party to access its data in the Intercloud environment. Majority of current used authorization frameworks assume that all entities' identities and attributes are known. Federated identity management systems can solve the problem of the multi-domain access control but current setups and managements require significant human involvement and can not be fully automated.
In this context, using trust management for authorization purpose provides a more flexible solution than traditional authorization mechanisms. With trust management, authorizers can use trusts to make authorization decisions. The chain of interacting cloud services requires that such authorization systems need to support multiple levels of delegation. In this paper, we propose a dynamic trust establishment protocol for distributed authorization in multi-providers Intercloud environment. We define our contributions as follows. Based on the traditional attribute-based access control model (ABAC), 978-1-4673-4510-1/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE 533 we propose an attribute-based trust model approach that uses logic expressions for deriving authorization decisions based on trust evaluations. The trust model is then applied to propose the dynamic trust establishment protocol, that has been used as a part of the Dynamic Access Control Infrastructure for On-demand provisioned cloud-based infrastructure services in the GEYSERS project [3] . Finally, we propose a practical implementation of the attribute-based trust scheme using Multi-type Intervals Decision Diagrams (MIDD), which by our analysis demonstrates noticeable performance advantages comparing to traditional ABAC implementations using Datalog.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces attribute-based trust model and related concepts in the Intercloud environment. In section III, we incorporate the trust model into cloud provisioning life-cycles [4] to enable dynamic trust establishments among entities. Section IV presents a method to implement the attribute-based policies evaluation with MIDD. Section V describes the state of the art of existing trust management mechanisms for distributed authorization and identifies their limitations in the cloud ecosystem. Finally, section VI contains summaries and describes future research on trust management model and mechanisms for clouds.
II. TRUST MODEL
This section analyzes trust model in the multi-provider Intercloud environment, which includes entities, trust relationships and approaches to establish trust relationships.
A. Definitions 1) Entities:
A sophisticated cloud scenario [2] may involve number of different entities [5] , which can be classified as follows.
• Cloud providers and cloud clients: When entities in the cloud ecosystem can offer services to others, they are called cloud providers. The subscribers are called cloud clients. Some entities may have two roles, both provider role and client role. In Fig. 1 
2) Trust:
In the context of authorization for clouds, trust of an entity (trustor) to another one (trustee) is the belief of trustor in the trustee that the trustee can behave reliably, dependably and securely in some specific contexts. It can be seen that trust is the basis for authorization. An entity only grants permission to another one only if it trusts the other, not for everything, all the time, but on specific conditions and limited time, as known as the specific context. For example, entity A is an expert in finance, entity B who trusts A's capabilities, will take consideration from A's comments on finance issues, but may not accept A's ideas on others.
This example illustrates an important requirement, which is how the trust is established. We can assume after seeing A's certificates on finance, or A's experience history, B will trust A in the finance area. In most abstraction, the trustor trusts the trustee in a specific context when the trustee can show enough attributes that satisfy trustor's criteria, and the trustor, by some mechanisms, makes sure that these attributes are validated. This is the basic formation of attribute-based trust establishment.
3) Trust relationships: The trust relationships in cloud computing have following properties:
• Asymmetric: the relationships have directions, i.e. A trusts B does not mean B trusts A.
• Contextual: the trust should bind with a specific context, e.g. A trusts B as the Network cloud provider, but not trust as the Storage cloud provider.
• Time-constraint: The trust should have limited lifetime.
In cloud computing, the lifetime of the trust between cloud providers and cloud clients depends on subscription contracts between them. We classify trust relationships into two following types, depending on their lifetimes and how they are established:
• Direct trust relationship: is the trust relationship between a cloud provider and its direct clients. It is a bilateral relationship in a long-term period which is based on subscription contracts and usually is enforced by SLAs.
• Indirect trust relationship: is the trust relationship between a cloud provider and client through one or several intermediate cloud providers. This is a dynamic, trust relationship formed during service consumption in a limited time (compare to the long-term period in SLAs). This relationship is often established based on several direct trust relationships.
B. Trust Policies
There are variety of foundation techniques to build up trust management systems, such as logics, database for-978-1-4673-4510-1/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE 534 malisms, graph theory, Datalog, etc [6] . In this paper, we use attributes in logic formulas to enforce trusts between entities. Selecting attributes in logic formulas not only adapts requirements of Intercloud environment in section III, but also can be implemented with advance evaluation complexity as we will discuss in section IV.
1) Attribute-based trust policy:
The trust between two entities should have a specific semantic meaning, or trust context. The trust statement between two entities is defined as: "Alice trusts Bob on context X".
By defining the context as set of attributes, the trust statement can be formulated as logic conditions on attributes which are combined by boolean operators, e.g. and, or, not. The context X is defined as a vector consisting of n attributes X = (x 1 , x 2 ...x n ), x i ∈ P i , in which P i is the domain value of the attribute x i .
The trust statement is analogized as a logic condition expression over the vector variable X. We call it as the attribute-based trust policy:
The trust policy (1) illustrates the following trust statement: the actor trusts the target on context X when the logic conditions expression f is satisfied. trust is the predicate of the policy.
2) Policies for delegation: The indirect trust relationship in the model is based on the concept of conditional trust transitivity [7] . In this concept, entity C may trust A by an indirect trust relationship if there is an existing intermediate entity B that plays as the trust recommender. Following conditions need to be satisfied:
• The recommender B trusts A and recommends it to C • The trustor C trusts B as the recommender.
• In the process of evaluation the trust to A, C can count on recommendations receiving from B. In our attribute-based trust model, these conditions are described as follows:
• B trusts A based on context X A , then issues a recommendation in the form of a trust credential tc XA B .
• C asserts that B is a legit recommender for the trust context X B , X A ⊆ X B .
• With recommendation tc XA B and the context X A , C uses a recommendation policy to decide if it can trust A. These conditions are described by following notations:
• Attribute issuing policy at B: denoted as f I B . It's similar to trust policy, but the predicate is an issued credential as the approval of B for context X A .
is the recommendation of B on the context X A .
• Delegation policy at C: denoted as f D C , defines set of targets which are eligible as recommenders for the context X B .
• C can evaluate the recommendation of B by using its recommendation policy, denoted as f
, plays the role as a trust credential exchanging among entities. Its implementation should guarantee the authenticity of the issuing recommender and the integrity of the trust context that it conveys. The function valid has the purpose to check the integrity of trust credentials. In section III, we propose a scheme to provide these properties.
3) Delegation trust chain: When cloud resources are composed from stack of cloud providers, say CP 1 → CP 2 ... → CP k , in which the provider CP i subscribes cloud resources from provider CP i−1 , the trust chain from CP 1 to CP k is established when delegations are setup along the path. The condition to build this trust chain is:
III. DYNAMIC TRUST ESTABLISHMENT MECHANISM
FOR INTERCLOUD This section identifies challenges on building up a trust establishment protocol for Intercloud environment. Our approach shows that it can be solved by incorporating attributebased trust polices in section II into cloud provisioning lifecycles [4] .
A. Challenges 1) Distributed policies and attributes:
Trust policies and attributes are usually distributed at different security domains. The evaluation of formula (5) needs to collect decisions and attributes from these domains. We propose to use the Pull and Push sequences in [8] for distributed policy evaluations. The Pull sequence is illustrated in the Fig. 3 .
2) Local name spaces: Understanding semantics of attributes crossing domains is not trivial, when domains often have their own attribute name spaces. With direct relationships in the Intercloud, semantics of name spaces can be defined in SLAs so that clients and providers can understand each others. However, indirect relationships need other mechanisms rather than SLAs.
While it is impractical to define a global name space for every domain, we suggest to use semantic techniques to transform contexts between local name spaces. Assuming cloud providers have their own ontologies for their resources We propose a dynamic trust establishment protocol, part of the architecture in [10] , in which direct trust relationships are provisioned during cloud resources provisioning life-cycles. The following distributed trust chain discovery implements indirect trust relationships by using attributebased trust policies for enforcement.
B. Dynamic Trust Establishment
The direct trust relationship between cloud client and its cloud provider are setup during the deployment phase of the cloud security services provisioning life-cycles in [4] . The establishment workflow is described as below:
Context:
• A cloud client C wants to subscribe cloud resources from the cloud provider P .
• When reserving cloud resources, each client is assigned an unique identifier called Global Reservation Identifier (GRI). P has a Trust Management repository storing GRIs along with their related security parameters: public keys, policies (e.g. trust policies, delegation policies and recommendation-based trust policies).
Implementation:
• In the reservation phase, cloud client C and cloud provider P exchange security parameters: 1) C generate a pair of its public key P K C and equivalent secret key SK C . The P K C is then sent to cloud provider P to bind with C's GRI. 2) Based on the negotiated SLA, P creates a subscribed resources description using its cloud resource ontology. It then generates attribute-based policies in which trust contexts are derived from the subscribed resource descriptions, e.g. using INDL ontology to describe virtual infrastructure requests [9] . P also initializes the delegation trust policies for the subscribed client C. They are stored as security parameters for C, which are indexed by the GRI value in the repository.
• After the deployment phase, cloud client C holds its secret key SK C , public key of the provider P K P , the subscribed identifier GRI and descriptions of subscribed resources. The cloud provider P holds P K C , trust policies and delegation policies.
• In the operation phase, the trust relationships between C and P can be setup depending on resource requests coming to P : 1) If a specific request X comes directly from the cloud client C, signed by SK C , the cloud provider P will validate its origin by the P K C retrieved from repository and perform evaluating its context against trust policies. If it is trust, then P allows C to operate on resource described in X. This is the direct trust relationship from C to P . 2) If a request X comes from an external entity, say E, recommended by C, the interactions between this entity is illustrated in Fig. 2 . In this case, the indirect trust relationship between E and P is established based on policies managed by C. 3) For a chain of cloud providers, the Pull model can be applied as in Fig. 3 . In this figure, trust context X i is transformed between cloud name spaces; the trust credential tc i denotes the recommendation of the provider P i for the context X i to the successor provider.
• In the decommissioning phase, related parameters and policies binding to GRI of C are released from the repository, along with subscribed cloud resources. 
C. Trust Credential Validation
As mentioned in section II, the trust credential tc X Recommender should have authenticity of the recommender, context X integrity and limited lifetime. These requirements can be implemented by using cryptographic techniques as follows:
issuer := Recommender; s X := sign(SK, H(X)|t X );
in which H(X) is the one-way hash function of the trust context and t X is the lifetime value of the recommendation. SK is the secret key of the recommender in which its public key is in security parameters repository of the target provider. The signature is to protect the integrity of the context's content and validity of trust credential's lifetime.
The trust credential implementation can be integrated with SAML standard [11] by creating TrustStatement derived from the abstract SAML statement. 
IV. ATTRIBUTE-BASED POLICIES IMPLEMENTATION
We presents the MIDD which is extended from the Interval Decision Diagram in [12] . It represents a multivariable logic function as an acyclic, direct graph that is practical for implementation of attribute-based policy model in section II.
A. Multi-type Interval Decision Diagrams
The policies in section II can be seen as a multivariable function with signature:
Let a data interval I ⊂ P i be a range of values in the domain P i . Define a Boolean function h xi (I) as:
Function f in (6) is called independent with a variable x i in the interval I when:
In this case, we denote f x I i as the partial function of n-1 variables:
Given a domain P i , the set of intervals I(P i ) = {I 1 , I 2 , ..., I pi } is called to cover the domain P i of the variable x i when:
The cover I(P i ) is disjoint if:
According to Boole-Shannon expansion, a function f can be decomposed to several partial functions in respect of variable x i against a disjoint, covered partition I(P i )
Each partial function f x I i , independent with variable x i , can also be decomposed in respect to another variable, e.g.
The decomposition continues until the function is free from all variables. Then we can symbolize function f as a decision diagram G(V, E) that:
• G is a rooted, directed acyclic graph with a node set V having two types of nodes: terminal nodes and nonterminal nodes.
• A terminal node v ∈ V has the value r ∈ R. In our trust model, R is the set of trust predicates defined in policies.
• A non-terminal node v ∈ V has a variable x i ∈ P i of the function f in which its disjoint, covered data interval partition is I(P i ) = {I 1 , I 2 , ..., I pi }. Each interval I ∈ I(P i ) is equivalent to an out going edge e I xi ∈ E from the node v.
• The sub graph of the outgoing edge of non-terminal node v ∈ V is a partial function described by BooleShannon expansion in equation (12) . The formula (12) then can be represented as a decision diagram in following figure:
An example of a decision diagram is shown in Fig. 5 . It represents following policy:
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B. Computational Complexity
In this section, we estimate the computational complexity of the delegated trust chain in (5).
Any attribute-based policy with n attributes in section II can be transformed into a n − level MIDD described in (6) . Selecting an edge at each node using binary search algorithm has the average complexity is O(log(E)) with E is the maximal number of edges at a node, or number of intervals of an attribute. The computational complexity to evaluate the tree is O(n · log(E))
Given k multi-level cloud providers forming the supply chain for composite cloud resources, the computational complexity of the delegation trust chain establishment in (5) will be O(k·n·log(m P )). In theory, this complexity does not depend on the number of policies but only on the number of attributes n, the maximal number of data intervals E and the length of delegation chain k. However, practice shows that increasing number of policies also affect the number of data intervals, when each policy often has different intervals.
A drawback of the MIDD is the memory space consumption, which depends on number of nodes in the MIDD. A n − level MIDD with on average e edges of each node could cost up to n e · sizeof (node) memory. However, with optimized logic functions, the number of nodes can greatly reduced [12] . And it is also possible to apply various techniques to mitigate memory cost [12] , [13] .
Because our model uses attributes in logic formulas, it is practical to use its implementation for attribute-based policy languages such as XACML [14] to achieve noticeable performance.
Other mechanisms such as RT policy languages [15] , [16] , [17] often have exponential times evaluation. For RT 1 scheme, the computational time is O(M · N v+2 ) with M is the size of credentials set (the RT credential is similar to our policy concept), N = max (N 0 , pN 0 ) , N 0 is the number of credentials, each credential has at most v variables, and p is the maximal number of arguments of role names in RT credentials.
V. RELATED WORK
The problem of trust management for authorization in distributed, decentralized environment was initially investigated by Blaze et al. [18] . Subsequent work represented Datalog trust policy languages by Li and Michell [16] and then Role-based trust management language [15] , in which trust policies map subjects to roles based on attributes in their RT credentials, then decisions were given from roles. Because of distributed properties of attributes in decentralized environment, they developed a credential chain discovery algorithm to retrieve and collect credentials. Such algorithms belonged to trust negotiation process aware of privacy of sensitive attribute information such as automated trust negotiation of Li et al. [19] or the Privacy-aware role-based access control framework by Ni et al. [17] . These approaches are difficult to apply to Intercloud when they do not have efficient mechanisms to deal with local name spaces issues and inefficient evaluation. Our direction, in other hand, uses attributes as the primitives for trust evaluation, which can be transformed among clouds by semantic techniques to transform attributes between ontologies of local name spaces, as well as has noticeable computational complexity.
XACML is a XML-based declarative access control policy language [14] . Its model supports distributed authorization scenarios, where authorization decision engines and authorization enforcement points are separated. In spite of its popularity in various products and applications, XACML implementations such as SunXACML, Enterprise XACML have different performances and not very efficient due to no official recommendation implementation from OASIS [20] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we identified the challenges of trust management for distributed authorization for multi-provider Intercloud environment. We then proposed a formal trust model that uses attribute-based trust policies. The proposed model can be applied in cloud provisioning life-cycles to provide the dynamic trust establishment protocol. Furthermore, we present an implementation approach of the attribute-based trust policies evaluation by using Multi-type Intervals Decision Diagrams, by analysis, having noticeable performance comparing to other ABAC implementations.
978-1-4673-4510-1/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE For attribute resolutions among cloud name spaces, we plan to apply semantic techniques to transform attributes ontologies from cloud to cloud. For integration of proposed protocol to the Dynamic Access Control Infrastructure, we are developing the attribute-based trust policies engine using MIDD as the back-end, while any attribute-base policy languages such as XACML [14] can be used at frontend for administrations. The dynamic trust establishment protocol implementation can support existing standards such as SAML [11] to communicate between cloud providers.
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